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A CHANGE OF HABIT
FRANCINE M. CORCORAN*
The United States Constitution establishes the right of the federal
government to raise revenues' and the right of individuals to exercise
their religious beliefs free from state interference.2 The inevitable interac-
* Member, St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This section reads in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes ... to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States .... Id.
The sixteenth amendment further expanded this "power": "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI.
' U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. .
Id.
See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947). In colonial America, groups such as Quakers, Protestants, and Catholics were
forced to support governmentally sponsored churches. Everson, 330 U.S. at 10. The first
amendment sprang from the anger of these dissenters. Id. at 11. Further, the colonial Amer-
icans formed a general conclusion that individual religious freedoms were best promoted
when a government was without the power to support or aid religions. Id.
James Madison, considered to have been instrumental in the drafting and adoption of
the first amendment, believed:
[T]hat a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person ... should be
taxed to support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society
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tion of these rights has resulted in the exemption of churches and reli-
gious organizations from federal taxation.' Members of religious orders
required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions
were the inevitable result of government-established religions.
Id. at 12.
Three interpretations of the first amendment were formulated. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 816 (1978). The evangelical view, supported by Roger Wil-
liams, warned against excessive interactions by claiming that worldly corruptions might con-
sume the unprotected churches. Id. at 817. The Jeffersonian view was concerned with the
inundation of religious beliefs onto the secular interests of the state. Id. The "'wall of sepa-
ration between Church and State'" was intended to prevent this. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). The Madisonian view provided
for the advancement of both religion and state through a diffusion and decentralization of
power in order to reduce the likelihood of either's dominance by assuring competition. L.
TRIBE, supra, at 817.
The traditional approach used to assess Establishment Clause violations is a tripartite
test espoused by the Supreme Court. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
The three questions utilized by this test are: (1) whether the program has a secular purpose;
(2) whether the primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) whether the
legislation avoids "'an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.'" See id. (quot-
ing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). If any prong is not met, an Establishment Clause violation ex-
ists. See id. at 613-14. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982)
(secular purpose valid but statute unconstitutional because it primarily advances religion);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (despite secular purpose statute does not pass
constitutional muster due to difficulty with effect and entanglement criteria); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975) (if direct advancement resulted, impermissible establish-
ment of religion resulted); see also Note, Mail Order Ministries, The Religious Purpose
Exemption, and the Constitution, 33 TAX LAW. 959, 975-76 (1980). The first prong of the
Lemon test is rarely used to invalidate government programs; the second prong examines
the effect of state action; and the third "poses the most rigorous of the three tests." See id.
at 976-77.
' See Walz, 397 U.S. at 676-80. One religion was not to be sponsored or aided by the tax
exemption; it was applied to all religions. See id. at 672-73. The Walz Court also mentioned
that the tax exemption had a history dating back to the first federal income tax. Id. at 676.
Such an uninterrupted practice could not be "lightly cast aside." Id. at 678.
Although never articulated, it is thought that the tax exemption was granted to pro-
mote good will and because the churches provided benefits and services to society. See Note,
supra note 2, at 973. It has been suggested that fostering the development of these benefits
justifies the tax exemption. See id.
It has been further noted that religion cultivates a state's moral or mental improve-
ment. See Mangrum, Naming Religion (and Eligible Cognates) in Tax Exemption Cases,
19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821, 827 (1986). The Walz Court derived for the state "an affirmative
policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life
and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest." Walz, 397 U.S. at
673.
The conclusion of the Walz Court, that tax exemption would contribute the least to
excessive governmental entanglement, was premised on the theory that elimination of the
exemption would expand government involvement by necessitating valuation of church
properties, liens, and similar assessments. Id. at 674-75. See also B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 168 (1983) (current state of law is that tax exemptions do not
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who generate income as agents of their organizations4 were traditionally
not subject to taxation.5 Conversely, income received as a result of ser-
vices rendered in an individual capacity was deemed taxable.s Recently in
violate first amendment). The Walz Court however, was careful not to base tax exemption
on specific services or on charitable works the church took part in. See Mangrum, supra, at
827. This would produce entanglement and minimize neutrality, which would give rise to
more confrontations. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
Religious members under a vow of poverty are generally divided into three groups for tax
purposes. See Hageman, An Examination of Religious Tax Exemption Policy Under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) Internal Revenue Code, 17 VAL. UL. REv. 405, 425 (1983); Wittenbach, Re-
muneration Earned by Members of Religious Orders: Is It Taxable?, 57 TAXES 553, 558
(1979). The first group includes members performing services for the church. See id. at 558.
Revenue Ruling 77-290 exempts from taxation members in this situation who work for an-
other agency of the supervising church or an associated institution. Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2
C.B. 26. See also Wittenbach, supra, at 558.
The second group is composed of members of religious orders working for charitable
organizations, such as a hospital or a college, but not a church. See Wittenbach, supra, at
558. For a tax exemption, an agency relationship must be established. Id. A noted Revenue
Ruling in this area concerned a nun who was a registered nurse working at a hospital. Id.;
see Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35. She was deemed an agent of her order and her income
was not taxed because she remained at all times subject to the order's control. See Rev. Rul.
68-123, 1968-1 C.B. at 35-36.
The third group is comprised of members of religious groups whose employment situa-
tions are classified as being "secular." Wittenbach, supra, at 558. Generally it is presumed
that no agency exists. Id. As an added note, if an agency relationship is proven, the income
will not be included in the income of the individual. Id. However, the religious order will be
taxed under section 511 of the Internal Revenue Code as unrelated trade or business in-
come. Id. at 558-59; see also Myers, Vow of Poverty Ruling, 24 CATH. LAW. 221, 223 (1979)
(IRS seems to break members into certain taxable and nontaxable categories).
-O.D. 119, 1. C.B. 82 (1919). The Official Decision reads in pertinent part: "Members of
religious orders are subject to tax upon taxable income, if any, received by them individu-
ally, but are not subject to tax on income received by them merely as agents of the orders of
which they are members." Id. See Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26, 27 (reiterates and es-
pouses Office Decision 119 as still being valid law); Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35, 36 (as
an agent of order, nun/nurse should not be taxed individually). See also 2 MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 17.11, at 70 (J. Doheny ed. 1982) ("money received by a minis-
ter as agent for a church'is not taxable to him"); Reed, Revenue Ruling 77-290 - Vow of
Poverty, 24 CATH. LAW. 217, 219 (1979) (IRS is concerned with agency, not with religion);
Wittenbach, supra note 4, at 555 (agency relationship must be established by services per-
formed for related church organization). But see Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005,
1012 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (member of religious order is not ipso facto an agent for tax purposes);
Kelley v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 131, 138 (1974) (priest living as layman for personal reasons
not acting as agent).
' Fogarty, 780 F.2d at 1012-13. The Federal Circuit court concluded that a priest who
taught in a religious studies department of a university was properly taxed as an individual
after a review of relevant factual indicia. Id. See Kelley, 62 T.C. 131. In Kelley, despite his
vow of poverty, a priest acted as an individual considering he retained all his material pos-
sessions obtained during a short leave, and he was therefore properly taxed. Id. at 138. See
also Macior v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 91, 93 (1984) (Franciscan Friar living in
nonconformity with his vow of poverty received income as an individual); Reed, supra note
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Schuster v. Commissioner,' the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that a nun's income for staff nurse-midwife services, although in fur-
therance of the objectives of the Order, was earned in an individual ca-
pacity, not as an agent of her Order, and was thereby taxable.8
In Schuster, petitioner, Sister Francine Schuster, was a member of
the Order of the Adorers of the Blood of Christ (the "Order").9 Members
of the Order were encouraged to secure work in occupations that fur-
thered the general purposes of the Order.10 Members were also required
to take vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty.1' To further her medical
skills and her obligation to the Order, Sister Francine took part in a
funded educational program,' 2 and upon completion was required to work
5, at 217 (all members subject to payment of income tax unless working for their orders);
Wittenbach, supra note 4, at 554 (discussing Rev. Rul. 77-290 and stating that one under
vow of poverty can be taxed individually).
7 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986)
' See id. at 678.
* See id. at 673. The Order was a Roman Catholic organization incorporated in 1886 in
Illinois, as the Convent of the Sisters of the Precious Blood. Schuster v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 764, 765 (1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986). The Order is a tax exempt organiza-
tion. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 673.
10 See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 673-74. The employment secured by the member was subject to
ultimate approval by the Order. Id. The Order's approval was contingent upon whether the
employment related to the purposes of the Order. Id. at 674. The purposes of the Order are:
[T]o conduct schools and places of learning and to promote education, to advance the
cause of religious and social work, to conduct hospitals and institutions for the care
and treatment of suffering humanity and to do all and everything necessary or con-
venient for the accomplishment of any of the purposes or objects and powers above
mentioned or incidental thereto.
Id. at 673.
11 See id. at 673. Sister Francine executed a "Declaration Concerning Remuneration."
Schuster, 84 T.C. at 765. Within this document she agreed "'never [to] claim or demand,
directly or indirectly, any wages, compensation, remuneration, or reward ... for the time or
for the services or work that I devote for ... [the Order] during the time I may remain there
or elsewhere in the name of or upon commission from said (Order].'" Id. at 765-66. If Sister
Francine wished to leave the Order, she would be permitted to take only the personal prop-
erty she brought into the Order, as well as gifts and inheritances. Id. at 766. Furthermore,
pursuant to the vow of poverty, a member was not allowed to keep any of the income earned
during her employment. Id. She did not in any way control the money. Id.
When it was impractical for a member to live at the convent or the Mother House, a
residence was rented for her. Id. at 767. A budget was prepared and, upon approval, the
member was entitled to a stipend for living expenses that was in no way related to the
earned income. Id. For the year at issue, Sister Francine received thirty-five dollars a
month. Id.
Under the vow of obedience, a member was required to put the Order's will before hers.
Id. at 766. She could not accept any employment without the express approval of the Order,
and upon employment could not quit without approval. Id. Even in ordinary work situa-
tions, the member was subject to the Order's will. Id.
" See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 674. Pursuant to section 822(b) of the Public Health Service
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in a "health manpower shortage area."'13 She secured employment with
Su Clinica Familiar (the "Clinic") 14 which was involved in an employment
program administered by the National Health Services Corps ("NHSC"),
a division of the United States Public Health Service. 1 5 The Order ap-
proved her selection and sent correspondences to the NHSC and the
Clinic concerning Sister Francine's services and requested that they be
paid directly. 6 The Clinic rejected the Order's request, noting that the
checks would be made out to Sister Francine individually;17 the NHSC
failed to respond at all."8 For the duration of her employment, 9 Sister
Francine endorsed each check over to the Order, pursuant to her vow of
poverty.2 0 Sister Francine's 1980 income tax return reflected her wages
but declared that she was exempt from taxation because of her affiliation
with the Order.2 The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency claiming
Act, an educational grant was bestowed upon Sister Francine to cover her tuition, books,
fees, living, and moving expenses. Id. She attended the University of Mississippi Medical
Center and participated in the Nurse Midwife Program. Id.
13 Id. This was for a twelve month period. Id. A "health manpower shortage area" is defined
as "any of the following which the Secretary determines has a shortage of health man-
power: (1) An urban or rural area ... ; (2) a population group; or (3) a public or nonprofit
private medical facility." 42 C.F.R. § 5.2 (1985)
" See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 674. Before Sister Francine interviewed for the position, she
obtained permission to do so. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 768.
The Clinic had a family health service program. Id. Although not affiliated with the
Order, the Clinic was a Catholic charity. Id. at 786 n.2 (Korner, J., dissenting).
15 Schuster, 800 F.2d at 674. Part of the Clinic's staff was employed through the NHSC.
Schuster, 84 T.C. at 768. The NHSC paid the employees and they received federal employee
benefits. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 675. In effect, Sister Francine was treated as a civil servant.
Id.
,e See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 675. The letter to the Clinic read in pertinent part:
The Community of Adorers of the Blood of Christ would like to contract with you for
the services of Sister Francine Schuster, ASC, for the position of nurse-midwife for
one year at Su Clinica Familiar.
If our offer is acceptable, we request that payment for her services be made to
the Adorers of the Blood of Christ.
Brief for Appellant at 11, Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-
2345).
" See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 675. The Clinic formally accepted Sister Francine onto their
staff. Id. The Clinic's administrator further offered a suggestion as to how to endorse the
checks over to the Order. Id.
"8 See id.
" Sister Francine worked from July 23, 1979 until 1982, when federal funding stopped. Id.
20 See id.
" See id. Sister Francine claimed her income was not subject to taxation by reason of her
being an agent of a religious order pursuant to Rev. Rul. 77-290. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 771.
See Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26 (income received by member as agent is income of
Order and not member). See also Wittenbach, supra note 4, at 555 (if religious member
performs services for charitable organization, agency relationship must be established for
tax exemption).
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that Sister Francine was not an agent of the Order when she earned the
wages.2 Sister Francine filed a petition in the United States Tax Court
refuting the determination by the Commissioner. 3 The tax court held
that petitioner's wages were earned in her individual capacity, not as an
agent of the Order and were therefore subject to federal taxation. 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the tax court's
decision.25
Writing for the majority, Judge Barker 2 held that the decision of the
tax court, albeit by a different analysis, was effectually correct.27 The Sev-
enth Circuit rejected the "agency triangle" test espoused by the tax court
deeming it too narrow an approach in ascertaining Sister Francine's tax
liabilities. 28 After acknowledging the applicable tax provision 2 Judge
Barker proceeded to adopt a flexible test s which was to be based on a
2 Schuster, 800 F.2d at 675.
13 Id. at 675-76.
24 See Schuster, 84 T.C. at 778. The tax court, in holding that Sister Francine's income was
taxable, relied on a "triangle agency" theory. See id. at 775-76. The majority, in an opinion
written by Judge Wilbur, concluded that the Order, the Clinic, and the NHSC were not
contracting for Sister Francine's services. See id. at 775-76. Sister Francine was thereby
deemed a federal employee because she had contracted individually to perform services for
the Clinic. See id. She had, in effect, received wages and assigned them over to the Order.
See id. at 773-74. Applying fundamental tax law and casting aside any reference to Sister
Francine's contractual relations with the Order, the court rendered her income taxable. See
id. at 773.
2 See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 679.
" See id. at 673. Judge Barker of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana, sitting by designation. Id.
11 See id. at 679.
" See id. at 677. The court expressly rejected this argument. Id. The "agency triangle" test
is premised on a finding that the employer and the principal expressly contracted for the
agent's services and the income earned is for the principal's benefit. Id. See Schuster, 84
T.C. at 775-76 (indication of control and relationship between parties is necessary for in-
come to be imputed to principal on "agency triangle" theory). See also Johnson v. United
States, 698 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1982) (income earned by an agent not imputed to princi-
pal because control of agent's activities and recognition by third party lacking). However,
the Schuster court felt that the Johnson two part test was too constrained as well as an
inadequate inquiry. Instead, the court opted to analyze other relevant factors in conjunction
with the third party employer and principal relationship. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678.
29 See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 676; I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1986). This section states: "Except as
otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source
derived, including . . . (1) [c]ompensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe
benefits and similar items." Id. See also Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,
430 (1955) (gross income includes "all gains except those specifically exempted").
"0 The flexible test was previously utilized in the Fogarty case. See Fogarty v. United
States, 780 F.2d 1005, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The factors analyzed by the test include:
[(1)] the degree of control exercised by the Order over the member... [(2)] ownership
rights between the member and the order... [(3)] the purposes or mission of the
order... [(4)] the type of work performed by the member vis-a-vis those purposes or
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factual analysis of each case."1
Judge Cudahy, writing as the lone dissenter, observed that the major-
ity was unduly prejudiced in its analysis due to its staunch adherence to a
fundamental tax theory32 and the alarming growth of the tax protest
movement.3 3 Although agreeing that the "agency triangle" test was appro-
priately rejected, the dissent also found the majority's flexible test inap-
plicable.3 4 Instead, Judge Cudahy proposed a three part test 5 which
would effectively determine whether Sister Francine was acting as an
agent of the Order. 6 Judge Cudahy concluded that proper application of
mission... [(5)] the dealings between the member and the third-party employer, ([in-
cluding the] circumstances surrounding job inquiries and interviews, and [the] con-
trol or supervision exercised by the employer), and [(6) the] dealings between the
employer and the order.
Id. at 1012.
" See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 677. The court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily on
the Fogarty case. See id. Fogarty involved a priest who taught in a university and who,
pursuant to a vow of poverty, signed his checks directly over to his Order. Fogarty, 780 F.2d
at 1006. The Fogarty court, in determining that Father Fogarty earned his income as an
individual rather than as an agent of his Order, rejected the "agency triangle" and "loaned
out employee" theories and instead relied upon six relevant factors in addition to general
rules of agency. See id. at 1012.
The Schuster court noted that this flexible approach was more appropriate in the case
before it and thereby inquired into the underlying facts. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 677.
" See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 679 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy focused on the
court's underlying rationale, which he believed stemmed from Justice Holmes' opinion in
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 679 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
This principle was premised on the notion that the mere assignment of income by the
earner would not shift the tax burden along with it. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 115.
3 Schuster, 800 F.2d at 680 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy also claimed that this
decision was a reaction to the tax protest movement, where some people had fraudulently
used the religious exemption in an attempt to avoid taxation. See id. (Cudahy, J., dissent-
ing). Unfortunately, changing policies in this area worked only to impose a hardship on a
legitimate claim. See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy declared that the test proposed by the
majority was strangely similar to the Johnson court test which was supposedly cast aside for
being too narrow and inflexible. See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
35 See id. at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy emphasized three factors. The first
and most controlling factor focused on whether the principal had a "right to direct or con-
trol the agent's activities in a meaningful way." See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Secondly,
the question was whether the principal had "the right to claim and take possession of the
compensation" without any adverse claim. See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Finally, whether
the services performed were of the type "within the mission or purpose of the alleged princi-
pal." See id. at 683 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 682-83 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The dissent analyzed the relevant facts in the
case, including the binding vow of poverty, the purposes of the Order, and the close funda-
mental control the Order exerted over Sister Francine. See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
Judge Cudahy shifted the focus away from the formal dealings of the parties and concluded
that a proper analysis would render Sister Francine an agent of the Order. See id. at 683-84
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
TAXATION OF RELIGIOUS
the law to economic realities would necessitate a determination that Sis-
ter Francine's income was not taxable.3
7
The Schuster court recognized that income earned by a member of a
religious order is not automatically exempted from taxation unless an
agency relationship can be established." It is submitted that the court
adopted an overly technical approach that lent itself to a superficial anal-
ysis. This Comment will analyze the flexible factors relied upon by the
court and suggest that relevant tax law and agency theory tend to estab-
lish a gray area where tax exemption is applicable despite the growing tax
protest movement. Finally, it will address the possible tax implications of
the Schuster decision on those seeking outside employment in further-
ance of their religious vows.
TAXATION AND THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
The Congressional power to tax income was greatly expanded by the
passage of the sixteenth amendment."9 Inherent in this provision is the
power to exempt certain charitable or religious organizations.40 Unless ex-
empted, all income received or assigned is taxable to the earner, regard-
less of whom actually receives the money. "1 However, if the income earner
does not have control over the money, there would be no personal tax
11 See id. at 684 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 679. See Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The court
held that the evidence was sufficient to find that a priest was not acting as an agent of his
Order and, therefore, his income was taxable to him individually. Id. at 1006. See also Kel-
ley v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 131, 138 (1974) (priest working outside his agency taxed on
income earned).
39 U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Before the sixteenth amendment was enacted, Congress relied on article I of the Consti-
tution to raise revenue. Hageman, supra note 4, at 406. Although the power to tax had
always been present, the apportionment provision restricted congressional latitude. Id. It
was not until the enactment of the sixteenth amendment that the government could control
who bore the tax burden without concern for apportionment. Id.
40 See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). The Court emphasized that exemp-
tions for certain entities were constitutionally sound based on the sixteenth amendment.
See id. at 21. See also Hageman, supra note 4, at 406. (sixteenth amendment impliedly gave
Congress power to tax and exempt religious organizations).
" Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). In this landmark tax case, Justice Holmes, writing for
the majority, held that taxation could not be circumvented by contracts or agreements
which would prevent salaries from vesting in the income earner. Id. at 115. This fundamen-
tal tax theory has been followed in many of the Court's later decisions. See, e.g., United
States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 450 (1973) (application of Lucas principle to partnership);
United States v. Joliet & Chicago R.R., 315 U.S. 44, 48 (1942) (payments made to share-
holders by lessee of corporate property are corporate income). See also Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949) (Court described first rule of taxation as "income
must be taxed to him who earns it").
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liability. "2 Traditionally, agents of tax exempt organizations were not per-
sonally taxed because the right of control over the income earned vested
in the organization."'
An agency relationship exists when the manifestations of the parties
demonstrate that the agent consented to act on behalf of and under the
control of the principal."' An express contract is not necessary, but mu-
tual consent is required.'5 In Schuster, Sister Francine's vows created a
binding contract with the Order."' The Order's acceptance of these vows
" See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). The Court held that a husband and wife in a
community state had the right to file separate returns using one half of the community
income as their respective incomes. Id. at 118. Each party, in effect, controlled one half of
the income. The husband could escape taxation on one half of the income because under
community property laws, he was an agent of the community and had no claim or control
over the total amount. Id. at 112.
It is submitted that the dissent in Schuster properly reasoned that Poe represented an
analogous situation to the one presented to the court and correctly argued that the income
earned by Sister Francine was never hers alone, but belonged to the Order. See Schuster,
800 F.2d at 683 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). But see Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005,
1009 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting analogy between marital and order/member relationships).
" Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920). The Court held that the
income received by the agent for the principal should be taxed to the principal. Id. at 345.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Cf. McGahen v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 468, 480
(1981) (alleged clergy taxed on income because he did not act as agent nor modify his finan-
cial behavior after taking poverty vow).
4 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958); see also Columbia Univ. Club v. Hig-
gins, 23 F. Supp. 572, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (agent was representative and acted for another
within his authority; therefore principal-agent relationship existed).
45 See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 comment b (1958). Inherent in the definition of
agency is the existence of a consensual relation. Id. Consequently, many courts have held
that an agency relationship is created by express or implied contract or by operation of law.
See, e.g., Rufenacht v. Iowa Beef Processors, 492 F. Supp. 877, 881 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (al-
though not found to exist in present case, agency denotes relationship created by express or
implied agreement), afl'd, 656 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982);
Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill. App. 3d 716, 724, 413 N.E.2d 457, 463
(1980) (consensual fiduciary relationship created by law by which principal may control
agent and agent affects legal relationships of principal).
46 See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 683 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); see also Order of St. Benedict v.
Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640, 651 (1914) (prerequisite of relinquishment of all private property
rights upon entering into ecclesiastical society held to be binding agreement on both parties
but not violative of public policy).
It is also noteworthy that the majority did not address the solidity of the agreement
between Sister Francine and the Order. The court instead focused on the fact that the Sis-
ter could have left at anytime. See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678. However, it is submitted that
the court missed the real issue-the nature of the agency relationship at the time the in-
come was earned. Gratuitous agents, acting without any renumeration and free to leave at
will, can still affect the legal relationships of both third parties and the principal while act-
ing as an agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 16 comment b (1958); see also
Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Miller, 451 N.E.2d 1099, 1102 (Ind. App. 1983) (church
held liable for tort committed by gratuitous agent). Sister Francine's freedom to possibly
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manifested the mutual consent necessary in creating an agency
relationship."'
The principal-agent agreement also creates a fiduciary relationship 8
in which the agent owes a duty of loyalty to the principal.49 Consequently,
although Sister Francine was an employee of the Clinic and the govern-
ment, she was still bound to act primarily on behalf of the Order in any
situations that arose.50 Also, pursuant to agency law, the agent must obey
all reasonable directions of the principal.51 Sister Francine, by agreeing to
effectuate the objectives of the Order, was required to comply with any
directives sent by the Order, whether they were employment related or
personal in nature. 52 Moreover, a principal has the right to control the
agent in relation to the matters in issue.53 The Order, in addition to con-
trolling Sister Francine's acceptance of the job offer and the money she
received on behalf of the Order, could, at any time, demand she terminate
her association with the Clinic.5" It is submitted that agency law dictates
withdraw from the Order would not affect the binding agreement with the Order and there-
fore was an irrelevant inquiry. See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 680 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
" To be accepted into the Order, a member had to agree to subordinate her will in further-
ance of the Order's mission. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 766. The Order thereby assumed control
over its members' missions and remunerations. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
"8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958). This fiduciary relationship exists be-
cause the agent has the power to effectuate the legal relationships of the principal. Id. § 13
comments a, b. See also Cozzens v. Bazzani Bldg. Co., 456 F. Supp. 192, 198 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (fiduciary obligation demands "not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive" (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928))).
'9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958). See also Campagna v. United States,
474 F. Supp. 573, 585 (D.N.J. 1979) (agent held to high standard of honesty and is under
duty to be careful, skillful, dilligent, and loyal in performance).
50 Schuster, 800 F.2d at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 (1958). This is a corollary of the principal's
right to control emanating from the basic agency definition. Cf. Kelley v. Commissioner, 62
T.C. 131, 138 (1974) (no longer agent, since his "vow of obedience" lacked substance).
82 Schuster, 800 F.2d at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Adhering to a directive from her Or-
der, Sister Francine notified the Clinic that she could not dispense artificial contraceptives.
Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting) The dissent noted that the Order's directive altered her work
routine so as to conform with the moral precepts observed by the Order. Id. (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1958); see also British Am. & E. Co. v.
Wirth Ltd., 592 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1979) (agent under control and supervision of principal
binds principal when acting within ambit of authority); Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313,
317 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (extent and right of control are valid issues when determining whether
agency exists).
, See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 680-81 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Despite the fact that Sister
Francine could resign at any time, the ubiquity of the Order's control overwhelmed the
member. See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Cf. McGahen v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 468, 479
(1981) (income accepted without Order's intervention nor accounting; Order's minimal de-
gree of control indicated that he contracted and functioned as individual); Macior v. Com-
missioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 91, 93 (1984) (contracting with University as individual, never
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a finding that Sister Francine and the Order were acting in a principal-
agent capacity created by Sister Francine's vows.
THE FLEXIBLE FACTORS APPLIED
The court in Schuster looked beyond the basic agency theory and
utilized a flexible test to hold that an agency relationship did not exist
when Sister Francine worked for the Clinic.55 In applying its test, the
court concluded that direct control was not manifested by the Order."
However, all of Sister Francine's acts while employed at the Clinic were
subject to the Order's approval thereby demonstrating its fundamental
control over virtually every aspect of her life.57 The fact that the
paychecks were payable to Sister Francine led the majority to conclude
that she possessed dominion and control over them."8 In reality, Sister
Francine obediently endorsed each check over to the Order. 9 Due to the
binding contractual obligation created by her vows, Sister Francine did
not have an exclusive right to the checks."'
In addressing the factors which dealt with the type of employment
and its relationship to the purposes of the Order, the court conceded that
these factors supported the existence of an agency relationship because
Sister Francine's duties were consistent with the enumerated purposes of
remitting salary to Order, and ex post facto attempts to negate personal ownership indi-
cated he was not controlled by Order and his income was taxable).
"' Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678-79. See Fogarty v. United States, 780 U.S. 1005 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The Fogarty court decided that in order to establish an agency relationship between
a priest and an Order the underlying facts should be considered. Id. at 1012. It is submitted
that the Schuster court misinterpreted the Fogarty decision and applied the factors too
rigidly and without an adequate understanding of the unique facts in each case.
" Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678. The court based this determination on two basic indicia. Id.
First, Sister Francine could withdraw from the Order at any time; secondly, the Order did
not exert day-to-day control over her. Id.
" See id. at 681-82 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The Order visited Sister Francine and if it
were found that she did not comply with its directives, she would be told to leave the em-
ployment. See id. at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 678.
59 See id.
60 Id. at 681 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). As the dissent noted, the court absolutely glazed over
the fact that Sister Francine's vows were not only legally binding, but also morally binding.
Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting). See L. FANFANI & K. O'RoURKE, CANON LAW FOR RELIGIOUS
WOMEN 199 (1961) (promise to obey is promise to God). See also Order of St. Benedict v.
Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640, 651 (1914) (recognizing binding status of vow of poverty). Fur-
thermore, it is submitted that economic reality had been overlooked. Sister Francine re-
ceived no money, except for her thirty-five dollar monthy allowance, yet was taxed on the
full amount of earnings. Cf. Kelley v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 131, 135 (1974) (priest con-
trolled his own money, opened up savings account, purchased car and retained all earnings
upon leaving Order).
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the Order.61 Finally, the remaining factors considered by the court in-
volved the interrelationship of the NHSC and the Clinic, Sister Francine
and the Order.62 As indicia of Sister Francine's individual capacity, the
court noted that she found the job on her own, never mentioned her
agency relationship with the Order, and the Order's request to be paid
directly went unanswered by the NHSC.63 However, this finding is erro-
neous in light of the degree of control exercised by the Order over its
members and the presence of a statement on file at the Clinic and the
NHSC clarifying Sister Francine's commitment to the Order.6 The letter
from the Clinic further advanced the proposition that the interrelation-
ships existed with the employer's knowledge of all the circumstances sur-
rounding Sister Francine's loyalties and personal convictions.65 It is sub-
mitted that upon a factual analysis, the factors weigh heavily in favor of
the existence of an agency relationship and therefore tax exemption.
TAX AVOIDANCE
Situations do arise where wages of religious members are properly
taxed.66 This usually occurs when the member, under the guise of reli-
gious agency, deviates from the vow of poverty,67 or obtains employment
El Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678. See also Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35 (nun working as
nurse, furthering purposes of Order, deemed an agent of the Order and not taxed
individually).
" Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678. Specifically, these factors involved the nature and extent of the
dealings between all the parties. Id.
" Id. Cf. Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1986) There was no
agreement between the University and Father Fogarty's Order. Id.
" See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The dissent introduced a docu-
ment on file at the NHSC which certified that Sister Francine was a member of the Order
and under a vow of poverty. Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting). It further stated that she per-
formed her services on behalf of the Order as an agent and all salaries would accrue to the
Order. Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 675. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 698 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1982). Johnson is
clearly distinguishable from Schuster because the third party in that case knew of the
agency relationship and adamantally refused to deal with the principal. See id. It is submit-
ted that since the Clinic and the NHSC knew of and did not strongly dispute the agency
relationship, an inference can be drawn that they acquiesced to it.
" O.D. 119, 1 C.B. 82 (1919). This official decision reads in pertinent part: "Members of
religious orders are subject to tax upon taxable income, if any, received by them individually
..... " See Fogarty, 780 F.2d at 1010. The court found that members of religious orders are
not always regarded as agents of their orders for federal tax purposes. Id. See also Myers,
supra note 4, at 223 (based on revenue rulings certain religious members would be taxed);
Hageman, supra note 4, at 425 (members' incomes under poverty vow may or may not be
taxed depending on its source).
"7 See, e.g., Kelley v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 131, 135 (1974) (although still member of Order
and presumably under vows of poverty and obedience, member had bank account and car
and even married before granted dispensation to marry); Macior v. Commissioner, 48
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in a secular area unrelated to the purposes of the order.68 Furthermore, a
rash of tax protest cases have inundated the courts in recent years, yield-
ing various examples of appropriate taxation measures taken against al-
leged religious members.6 9 However, sincere members of genuine religious
orders are being forced to suffer the consequences of the general move-
ment towards taxation.7 1 It is submitted that by taxing Sister Francine,
the court did not inquire into her true devotion, but instead painted a
policy statement using a broad brush and overly subjective criteria.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE Schuster DECISION
A pertinent question must be answered in the aftermath of the
Schuster decision. This question is what, if any, is a favorable tax alter-
native? If the courts refuse to recognize the agency relationship in such
situations there is another, although less desirable, tax alternative. The
religious member could claim a charitable deduction based on the amount
of income submitted to the Order.7 ' However, the applicable Internal
Revenue Code section reveals that such income would not be exempt
from tax since the individual charitable contribution provision provides
T.C.M. (CCH) 91, 93 (1984) (where Franciscan Friar held bank accounts as individual, had
unlimited access to income and never remitted income to Order, he had deviated from vow
of poverty and his income was taxable).
See Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26. A religious member working as an associate in a law
firm, although doing so as directed by his superiors, was not engaged in employment in
furtherance of the purposes of his religious order. Id. His income was fully taxed to him
because of the secular nature of the employment. Id.
" See, e.g., United States v. Ebner, 782 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendants took
fraudulent vows of poverty knowing they did not meet requirements for tax exemption);
Mone v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1985) (taxpayers fined for negligent and
intentional disregard of tax rules); Sparrow v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 914, 915 (4th Cir.
1984) (taxpayer's claim of exemption is frivolous without proof of religious Order); Stephen-
son v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 331, 333 (6th Cir. 1984) (unchanged lifestyle, irregular ser-
vices, and other factors indicated that church was pretense for tax avoidance purposes).
70 Schuster, 800 F.2d at 680 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Young v. Commissioner, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 1474, 1477 (1985) (nun taxed on income earned as physical therapist);
Woltering v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480, 1483 (1985) (nun taxed on income re-
ceived for mental counseling services). See also B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGA-
NIZATIONS 175 (4th ed. 1983) (law is becoming tough regarding sham situations, but resulting
legal principles are highly questionable outside areas of abuse).
7 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (1986). This section allows a deduction for income given as a gift to
"a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation-organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes .... " Id. See Rev.
Rul. 76-323, 1976-2 C.B. 18. This Revenue Ruling suggested that if the income is not ex-
empt, a member would include in gross income the entire remuneration received, whether or
not retained for living expenses. Id. However, each member would be entitled to a charitable
contribution deduction for a portion of the amount given to the Order. Id. See also Hage-
man, supra note 4, at 425 (member may deduct part of remuneration under section 170).
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for only a partial deduction.72
Based on the Schuster court's elevation of the "form" of the employ-
ment over the "substance" of the relationship, an unfavorable tax result
could be avoided by taking precautions at the initial stages of the rela-
tionship. The Schuster court focused on superficial control.7" Unfortu-
nately, the court failed to recognize the amount of control which an order
actually exerts over its members.7 4 Whenever possible, it would be wise to
specify the extent of the order's control over its agent's employment and
require the potential employers to accept these terms.75 In lieu of approv-
ing the member's employment contract, the order should independently
contract with the employer and require payments be made directly to the
order. Naturally, it would be within the order's discretion to accept only
those employment relationships that clearly advance the order's purposes
if they are interested in avoiding taxation problems. Judicial review of
like situations should also focus on the case before it, taking into account
the realities of control, the actual right to the income, and whether the
purposes of the order are being advanced by the employment.76 It is sub-
mitted that this approach would be more equitable than relying on a
functionally inflexible test. A careful factual analysis applying appropri-
ate agency and tax concepts would avoid future distortions. It is submit-
ted that although an order has an affirmative duty to clarify its relation-
ship with a member, the courts also have a duty to set aside a "tax all"
attitude and distinguish tax avoidance schemes from true tax exempt
situations.
72 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (1986). This section states that any charitable deduction to a quali-
fied organization "shall be allowed to the extent that the aggregate of such contributions
does not exceed fifty percent of the taxpayer's contribution base for the taxable year." Id.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. See also Wittenbach, supra note 4, at 556 (dis-
cussing section 170(b)(1) as alternate tax consequence).
73 See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678. The majority claimed that Sister Francine could leave at
any time and the Order did not retain day-to-day control over her. Id. It is submitted that
the control exerted by the Order was more than the court perceived.
71 See L. FANFANI & K. O'ROURKE, supra note 60, at 199. The vow of obedience is a promise
made essentially to God. Id. The vow of obedience demands surrender of one's will by sub-
jecting oneself to the will of lawful superiors. Id. Furthermore, when a superior commands
something that is within the rule, it is binding under pain of sin. Id. at 202.
7 See Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35. The nun was deemed to be under the Order's con-
trol because the Order affirmatively arranged for the nun's assignment to the hospital. Id. It
is submitted that although it may be more burdensome, perhaps the Order should make
more of an effort to supervise the nun's activities.
71 See Schuster, 800 F.2d at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The factors suggested by the dis-
sent, focusing on control, possession, and advancement, emphasize that formalities are not
persuasive and that factual situations and economic realities should control. Id. at 683-84
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
The court in Schuster disallowed a tax exemption for a nun who
worked outside her Order, albeit in furtherance of the Order's religious
and charitable purposes. The tax court and the Seventh Circuit held that
Sister Francine had not successfully proven that her duties had been per-
formed as an agent of the Order. It is submitted that the court erred in
its application of appropriate agency law, thus failing to properly deter-
mine Sister Francine's legal relationship with her Order. It is further sug-
gested that the analysis employed by this court digressed from the core
elements and instead focused on a rigid and inappropriate test. The deci-
sion of the Schuster court should signal to similarly situated religious
members an awareness of the possible tax consequences resulting from
their vocation.
